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2Abstract
Equilibrium pricing has been proven to underlie the Insured rational expectancy of
premia additivity for composition of policies fully covering independent risks.
Introduction
In a previus paper (Ghisellini (1998)), the form of the acceptable disutility
function for a rational Insured has been singled out by considering:
a) the Insured rational expectancy of premia additivity in case policies fully covering
independent risks are joined together,
b) the fact that, in the risk aversion hypothesis, the only disutility function family
coherent with both the constraint contained in point a) and the (possible) policy fairness
is given by
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where l>0 represents a cost (for instance the total loss amount) and >0 is the
parameter known in literature as "risk tolerance”.
The point a) results from the fact that the coverage configurations considered -
the first one corresponding to the joint action of two separated policies C1 and C2 fully
covering two independent risk K1 and K2, the second corresponding to a single policy C
fully covering the composition K of the risks K1 and K2 (the global risk) - are identical
in their effects, being identical their total pay off (indemnity) distribution (it is worth
noting that the present discussion is based on the further assumption - not specified in
the above-mentioned paper - that the two independent risks K1, K2 and the coverages C1,
C2 and C exist).
3For this reason, in the particular case here considered, the expectancy of the
rational Insured about policy premia is expressed by 21 PPP  , where P is the
premium of the policy C, P1 and P2 are the premia for policies C1 and C2.
The equilibrium condition underlying this argument constitutes the object of the
present note.
Premia additivity as equilibrium condition
Given the independent risks K1 and K2, let 1
~X and 2
~X  be the respective
stochastic functions describing the total loss values. Let K be the composition of the two
risks K1 and K2, 21
~~~ XXX   being the stochastic function describing the total loss
value related to the global risk K.
Let us consider the two coverage configurations specified in the Introduction. In
the first one, risks K1 and K2 are fully covered (retention identically zero) by the
separated policies C1 and C2 having 11
~~ XI   and 22
~~ XI   as total indemnities, P1 and
P2 being the premia. In the second configuration, the global risk K is fully covered by
the single policy C, the total indemnity being XI ~~   and the premium being P.
Proposition:
Under the hypothesis above specified, and under the further hypothesis that
credit risk or other aspects linked to Insurer rating are negligible, if the Insured and the
Insurers act in the Insurance market as rational players the additive composition of the
premia
21 PPP  (2)
4corresponds to the equilibrium condition. Moreover, this equilibrium pricing condition
is unique.
Proof
1. Total pay-off equivalence:
Being the stochastic functions 1
~X and 2
~X  mutually independent, coverages C1
and C2 result mutually independent as well because 11
~~ XI   and 22
~~ XI  . The
combined action 21
~~ II   of the two separated policies C1 and C2 is so associated to a
distribution function that is decomposable in the following way:
2121
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where "D" means distribution of the indicated variable and "*" means convolution.
But,
IXXXII DDDDDD ~~~~~~ 2121 **  (4)
and so:
III DD ~~~ 21  . (5)
Equation (5) demonstrates the fact that the total pay-off of the policy C is
completely equivalent to the one associated to combined action of the separated policies
C1 e C2. For that, policy C is completely equivalent to the two policies C1 and C2 taken
together.
2. Equilibrium
Let
},...,,{ˆ 21 nAAAA  (6)
be the set of all the Insurers acting on the market.
Let
5  },...,,{ˆ 1121111 CCCC , (7)


 },...,,{ˆ 2222122 CCCC (8)
and
  },...,,{ˆ 21 CCCC (9)
be respectively the sets of the full coverages offered by the market Aˆ  for the risks K1, K2
and K with n1 , n2 , n  and   = the empty set. As specified in the
Introduction and in (7)  (9), it is assumed that for each considered risk the market Aˆ  is
able to offer at least one coverage.
Let also
},...,,{ˆ 1121111 PPPP  , (10)
},...,,{ˆ 2222122 PPPP  (11)
and
},...,,{ˆ 21 PPPP  (12)
be the the sets of premia corresponding to 1ˆC , 2ˆC  and Cˆ .
The hypothesis of rationality and the hypothesis of negligible credit risk together
imply that the premia P1, P2 and P of the policies C1, C2 and C which the Insured would
consider, necessarily fulfil the conditions:
},...,,min{ 1121111 PPPP  , (13)
},...,,min{ 2222122 PPPP  (14)
and
},...,,min{ 21 PPPP  . (15)
Let 11
mA , 22
mA  and mA  be the Insurers supplying the coverages C1, C2 and C.
6The fact that (2) expresses an equilibrium condition is easily seen by analyzing
what happens in the cases P<P1+P2 and P>P1+P2.
If
21 PPP  , (16)
since the equivalence condition (5), the Insured would prefer C instead of the policies
C1 and C2 taken together. Again since (5), the Insurer Am - if for instance requested by
the Insured - could always be able to split the policy C into two separated policies 1
and 2 , fully covering respectively risks K1 and K2, and to supply them to the Insured at
the premia 1 and 2 valued
2121 PPP  (17)
(Borsh (1962)).
For this reason, at least one of the two following equation should hold true:
11 P , (18)
22 P (19)
this fact contradicting either (13) or (14).
If
21 PPP 	 , (20)
the Insurers 11
mA  and 22mA  would act, exploiting mutual independence of the risks K1
and K2 and so eq. (5), in order to supply a policy   equivalent to C but cheaper than C,
which would yield for both of them an economic result higher than the premia of
policies C1 and C2 by themselves supplied. One of the possible strategies could be the
one where 11
mA  supplies a full insurance of the global risk K for the premium
PPPP 

2
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, (21)
7the risk K2 being fully reinsured by 22mA  (which would take also client-service and
administrative costs for risk K2  as in the case of  policy C2) for the premium
2
21
22 4
P
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 . (22)
 The risk assumed by 11mA  would result K1, the net premium being given by
1
21
121 4
P
PPP
P 	




 . (23)
Equation (21) would contradict equation (15).
These last facts, together with the fact that the sets (7)-(9) are not empty, allow
saying that (2) constitute the equilibrium condition and that this equilibrium condition is
unique.
Q.E.D.
It is worth noting that eq. (13) - (15) constitute a necessary but not sufficient
conditions for the actual choice of the Insured. This means that the fact that the Insured
is “free” to purchase or not the policies (depending on their values) is preserved and
does not affect the present proof.
Conclusions
The premia additivity for composition of policies fully covering independent risks does
correspond to an equilibrium pricing condition. This objective condition, intrinsic in a
rational Insurance market, defines the rational pricing expectancy of the Insured in the
considered particular case and acts by constraining the Insured disutility function form
as described in Ghisellini (1998).
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